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Abstract
Southeast Asia is one of the most vulnerable regions of the world to the impacts of climate change. At the
same time, the region is also following a trajectory that could make it a major contributor to greenhouse
gas emissions in the future.
Understanding the economic implications of policy options for low carbon growth is essential to formulate
instruments that achieve the greatest emissions reductions at lowest cost. This study focuses on five
developing countries of Southeast Asia that collectively account for 90% of regional emissions in recent
years—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam. The analyses are based on the CGE
economy-energy-environment model ICES under an array of scenarios reflecting business as usual,
fragmented climate policies, an approximately 2.4°C post 2020 global climate stabilization target, termed
650 parts per million (ppm) carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalent (eq), and an approximately 2°C global target
(termed 500 ppm CO2 eq). Averted deforestation through reducing emissions from forest degradation and
deforestation (REDD) is included in some scenarios.
The study shows that global and coordinated action is found to be critical to the cost effectiveness of
emissions stabilization policies. A 650ppm stabilization scenario (below 3°C in 2100) has a similar cost to
the region to current fragmented targets, but achieves much higher levels of emissions reductions.
However, only some of the countries have short-term emissions targets that are consistent with a
stabilization scenario at 650ppm: these are Indonesia, Philippines and Viet Nam. None of the countries’
mid-term targets are coherent with more ambitious stabilization scenario at 500ppm.
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1. Introduction
Globally, there has been considerable attention to the emissions reduction potential of leading low-carbon
technologies, as well as their economic implications. The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) identified
1184 emissions scenarios from 31 global economy-climate models. These models generally find that global
emissions stabilization can be achieved at low economic cost, with a mean of just over 2% GDP reduction to
attain global climate stabilization consistent with a 2°C limit to mean global warming.
Much less is known about the implications of potential global limitation mechanisms for Southeast Asia,
even though it is the fastest growing source of emissions in the world. Only approximately 10% of scenarios
identified by the IPCC even report estimates for Asia as whole, which includes the People’s Republic of
China (PRC), the world’s largest emitter, and only a fraction of those studies report estimates specifically for
Southeast Asia or its individual countries. Those studies that do report Southeast Asian estimates often lack
clear indications of the potential costs entailed by emission reduction policies.
A number of recent model intercomparison exercises provide partial indications of costs for Asia and
Southeast Asia. The Stanford Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) 27 modeling comparison exercise (Kriegler et
al. 2014) is well cited and provides results for major Asian economies (e.g., PRC, India, and Japan) and the
Asian region. For Asia, GDP losses in 2050 show large variability among models, ranging from almost 0% to
27% and from 5.5% to 50% for stabilization scenarios of around 2°C of peak warming.
An important model comparison exercise with results for Southeast Asia is the “Low Climate Impact
Scenarios and the Implications of Required Tight Emission Control Strategies” (Kriegler et al., 2013; Tavoni
et al., 2013; LIMITS). The aim of the project was to analyze a set of climate policies with different level of
ambition in terms of climate change. In assessing the feasibility of different climate policies, the comparison
also indicates key energy technologies that might be relevant to transform current energy systems and help
reach future climate targets. The analysis only covers major economies (PRC or India) or large regions (e.g.,
Southeast Asia). It found that substantial emissions reductions can be achieved at relatively low cost for
Southeast Asia, with a median loss of 1% of GDP in 2030 and in 2050 under a scenario that limited warming
to 2°C.
A recent Asia-focused multimodel project is the Asian Modeling Exercise (AME). It brings together a
considerable number of integrated assessment models and regional models of Asian countries and
conducts a comparison of baseline, emissions target, and carbon tax scenarios. AME analyses explore the
contribution of different technologies to emissions mitigation (Akashi et al., 2012; Luderer and Pietzcker,
2012; Mi et al., 2012; Okagawa et al., 2012; Saveyn et al., 2012) and the co-benefits of emission reduction
policies in Asia (Dowling and Russ, 2012; Shrestha and Shakya, 2012; van Ruijven and van Vuuren, 2012; van
Vliet and Krey, 2012).
Overall, the AME provides limited information on the policy costs of climate mitigation policies. Indeed,
among all 28 articles published from AME, only two (Akashi et al., 2012, and Saveyn et al., 2012) contain a
clear costs assessment of temperature stabilization. According to the first study, the 2010–2050 cumulative
cost for Asia, discounted at 5%, in a radiative forcing stabilization scenario at 2.6 watts per square meter
(W/m2) would be about $6.16 trillion. The region would then bear roughly 45% of the world’s total
emission reduction costs and would sustain approximately a 1.7% loss of discounted GDP.
Saveyn et al. (2012) reported the cost implied by temperature stabilization at 2°C by the end of the century
for the PRC, India, and Japan, using a hybrid approach: a CGE model in which the functioning of the energy
sector is calibrated on information from the PRIMES and POLES bottom-up energy models. The world GDP
loss in 2050 would be 3.2%, with India and the PRC demonstrating much higher losses—8.1%, 6.3%
respectively—as well as much higher losses for countries with lower GDP. The study found that by mid

century, 77% of total world energy generation would be produced by zero carbon technologies in the
stabilization scenario.
Only a subset (i.e., 14 of 23) of the AME models performed stabilization scenarios at 2.5°C peak warming
(expressed as 3.7 W/m2) or at 2°C peak warming (expressed as 2.6 W/m2). Results for the Asia region
confirm that there is large uncertainty on the GDP costs to stabilize warming: for 2.5°C stabilization
scenario, they are 0%–4.6% in 2030 and up to 0%–7.5% in 2050. In the case of 2°C, they range from 0% to
3.4% in 2030 and from 0% to 7.9% in 2050. Of the 23 models, six also report results for Indonesia. For 2.5°C
stabilization, GDP costs are 0%–1.4% in 2030 and rise to 0%–6.3% in 2050, and for 2°C stabilization, they
are 0%–1.6% in 2030 to 0%–26.8% in 2050. Overall, Asia would contribute between 30% and 60% of global
emissions reduction.
Van Der Mensbrugghe (2010) explored the response of Asian economies to climate change impacts and
policy using the global CGE model ENVISAGE, updated with a simple climate module that converts the stock
levels of emissions into radiative forcing and thus into temperature changes. The study presented results
for six Southeast Asian countries, namely Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet
Nam, for the imposition of five different carbon taxes gradually imposed over 2004–2050, which peak at
$14–$109 per ton of CO2. As a whole, Southeast Asia would bear the largest policy costs with an average
income loss of 8.9% at $109 per ton of CO2 unitary tax. The losses were 11.5% in Viet Nam, 8.1% in
Malaysia, 5.8% in Indonesia, 3.5% in Thailand, and 1.1% in the Philippines. These costs do not reflect global
stabilization targets per se and no emissions trade is included in the model.
Thepkhun et al. (2013), applied a CGE model for Thailand to analyze emission reduction targets of 30% and
50% with respect to business as usual, coupled with several options that included CCS as well as emission
trading. The study found that 30% and 50% mitigation effort would reduce the annual average 2005–2050
GDP by nearly 0% and 4%, respectively, under a no emission trading scenario, while emissions trade plus
CCS would have positive effects on GDP.
All of these studies have critical limitations that impede their ability to offer mitigation policy-relevant
findings for Southeast Asia. First, those studies that offer findings for specific Southeast Asian countries do
not do so in the context of a global stabilization target. Rather, they explore cases of unitary carbon taxes
or imposed emissions reduction levels. Thus, they do not reveal the effects of likely emissions reductions to
be undertaken in the context of a global climate agreement, including how the countries would interact
with a global carbon market. Second, the studies that offer results for Indonesia or a Southeast Asian
aggregate in the context of global climate stabilization scenarios have omitted or underestimated land-use
emissions. This is especially important in Indonesia, where land-use emissions from deforestation and peat
oxidation make up the majority of emissions, and previous studies have underestimated those baseline
emissions by 100%–1,000%. In the absence of accurate baseline emissions, policy implications of emissions
reductions cannot be reliably identified. Third, there are limitations to the realism of stabilization scenarios
applied to date, as no exercise has explicitly modeled a transition from national targets in a pre-climate
agreement period, followed by a global stabilization regime implemented in the post-2020 timeframe
targeted by current international negotiations.
The present study addresses these limitations by exploring the potential implications of actual possible
policy outcomes from the UNFCCC process focusing on five countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Thailand, and Viet Nam (DA5 thereafter). The analyses are based on the economy-energy-environment
model ICES, a dynamic recursive CGE model.

2. Reference scenario
2.1 Indonesia
With a GDP of around $0.35 trillion and a population close to 250 million, Indonesia is the largest economic
system among the DA5 countries. It is also the largest GHG emitter; in 2010, the emissions totaled more
than 2,000 million tons (Mt) of CO2 equivalent, 1,400 Mt of which were contributed by land-use processes
and the remainder by industrial activity and agricultural production. The land-use emissions were largely
driven by deforestation activities that in the last 10 years had caused Indonesia to lose 5% of its forest
cover in favor of agricultural activities, especially oil palm production. With rapid industrialization, the
various industry sectors accounted for 47% of the country’s GDP by 2010, followed by services at 37.6%.
However, agriculture remains important with its share of 15.3% of total GDP.
According to ADB (2011), Indonesia is expected to demonstrate the highest average annual increase of GDP
growth rates among the DA5 economies until 2030, and to sustain this ranking afterwards although at a
lower growth rate. Its GDP is projected to reach a peak of $4.5 trillion in 2050, which would be a 1,141%
increase over the 2010 level. There will only be slight changes in the composition of its GDP generators
during the period. The service sector and the heavy manufacturing sector will grow in importance as the
main engines of growth, while the share of the agricultural sectors will decline to roughly half of their 2010
level, dropping to a low of 7.9% in 2050.
Total actual primary energy consumption in 2010 consisted of 52% oil and gas, 15% coal, 25% from
biomass, 8% geothermal, and 1% hydropower (IEA 2012b). In ICES, which excludes biomass and
geothermal, energy consumption in Indonesia is based almost entirely on fossil fuels, particularly oil, which
constitutes nearly 50% of 2010 primary energy demand. Indonesia in 2010 was the third-largest emitter in
per capita terms among the DA5 without considering land-use emissions; and was fourth in terms of the
energy and carbon intensities of GDP. The energy consumption mix is found by ICES to remain fairly stable,
with oil dominant at 50% of the total, followed by gas at roughly 30% and by coal at 20%. In the absence of
climate-related policies, the role of renewable energy remains negligible, with minor shares from
hydropower. To sustain Indonesia’s rapid growth, energy consumption is found to increase from 5
exajoules in 2010 to 33 exajoules in 2050, largely from fossil fuels.
The country’s GHG emissions will follow the growth of industrial production and GDP, increasing from the
2,200 MtCO2 equivalent in 2010 to 2800 MtCO2 equivalent in 2050. In particular, the fossil-fuel intensive
sectors—heavy manufacturing, services including transportation, fossil-fired electricity generation, and
household demand—will increase to nearly 90% of the total within that period from 34% of the total in
2010. The opposite will happen in the case of land-use emissions, the share of which is projected to shrink
from 66% to 10% of total emissions within that period.
Despite the sharp increase in energy use and emissions in Indonesia, both the energy intensity and the
carbon intensity of its GDP are projected to decline by roughly 60% within the period. This decline will be
driven mainly by autonomous improvements in energy efficiency.
Figure 2 reports the baseline deforestation patterns for Indonesia based on ADB (2011), Gusti et al. (2008),
and Eliasch et al. (2008). By mid-century, the country is expected to lose 15% of its 2011 forest cover, with
the loss reaching almost 14 million cumulative deforested hectares in 2050.

Table 1: Indonesia’s Annualized GDP Growth Rate, 2011–2050 (left) and Population (right)

GDP (yearly growth rates)
ICES simulated Projections
2011–2020

7.8%

7.8%

2021–30

8.7%

8.8%

2031–40

5.7%

5.6%

2010
2020
2030
2040
2050

Population (million)
239.9
262.6
279.7
290.2

293.5
2041–50
3.9%
3.3%
Note: Projections refer to ADB (2011b) data, integrated with information from local experts
GDPP = gross domestic product.

Figure 1: Indonesia’s Baseline Carbon and Energy Intensity, Levels* (left) and
Indexed, 2010=1 (right)
GDP = gross domestic product.
Note: Carbon intensity expressed in MtCO2eq/$ billion (left axis), energy Intensity expressed as EJ/$
billion (right axis)

a) Forest area (2010 = 100)

b) Cumulative deforestation (thousand hectares)

Figure 2: Indonesia’s Baseline Deforestation Pathways

2.2 Malaysia
In 2010, Malaysia’s GDP was around $0.15 trillion, slightly less than Thailand’s and slightly more than that
of the Philippines. However, with a population of 25 million (Table 2), which is one quarter that of the
Philippines and more than half of Thailand’s, it has the highest GDP per capita among the DA5. Malaysia’s
service sector has supported one of the more dynamic economic systems in the region in the last 30 years,
reaching a share of 46% of total value added in 2010, followed by industry at 43% and by agriculture at
11%. The industrial sector is largely based on heavy industry, which accounts for 4/5 of industrial
production. The energy sector, which accounts for 1/3 of industrial value added, relies mainly on natural
gas (around 60%) and oil (around 38%), with the remainder contributed by coal and a very tiny fraction by
hydroelectric sources.
In 2010, Malaysia emitted almost 400 MtCO2 equivalent of GHGs, mostly related to the production of
electricity and to transportation. Main emissions include CO2 (79%) and CH4 (15%). Malaysia is only the
third biggest emitter among the DA5 after Indonesia and Thailand, but has the highest level of emissions
per capita (excluding land-use emissions). In both energy and carbon intensity, Malaysia comes third after
Viet Nam and Thailand.
According to projections for 2010–2050 (Table 2), Malaysia’s GDP will grow on average by 5% annually,
reaching $1.1 trillion by 2050 or almost seven times that of 2010, spurred by the further development of
market services. From an initial contribution of 43% to national value added in 2010, the industrial sectors
(including energy) are expected to grow to more than 50% by 2050. Although the agricultural sectors are
expected to increase their production, their overall contribution to the national value added is projected to
shrink from the 11% level in 2010 to only 6% in 2050.
The overall energy production is projected to increase to 10.4 EJ in 2050. It will continue to rely primarily on
fossil sources, with coal replacing some of the oil requirements. Although hydroelectric energy is expected
to increase by more than ten times, its share of national energy production will remain negligible. This
applies as well to solar energy; despite a large increase at present from the 2010 levels, its generation in
2050 is projected to become much smaller.
All throughout 2010–2050, GHG emissions are found to grow more than twofold, with the electricity sector
accounting for almost half of national emissions. There will be a slight increase in share of emissions linked
to household consumption, and the share of emissions from land use will shrink to a very marginal level.
Overall emissions will increase but grow less in proportion to GDP, resulting in reductions in carbon
intensity of 56% and in energy intensity of 58%. Malaysia is projected to have lost almost 1/4th of its 2011
forest area by 2050 (Figure 4).
Table 2: Malaysia’s Baseline Annualized GDP Growth Rate, 2011 –2050 (left)
and Population (right)
Population (million)
GDP (yearly growth rates)
2010
28.4
ICES simulated
Projections
2020
33.0
2011–2020
5.4%
5.5%
2030
37.3
2021–2030
5.2%
4.8%
2040
40.8
2031–2040
5.0%
4.8%
2050
2041–2050
4.9%
4.8%
43.5
Note: Projections refer to ADB (2011b) data integrated with information from local experts.

Figure 3: Malaysia’s Baseline Carbon and Energy Intensity, Levels* (left) and Indexed, 2010 = 1
(right)
GDP = gross domestic product.
Note: * Carbon intensity expressed in MtCO2eq/$ billion (left axis), energy Intensity expressed as EJ/$
billion (right axis)

a) Forest area (2010 = 100)

b) Cumulative deforestation (thousand hectares)

Figure 4: Malaysia’s Baseline Deforestation Pathways

2.3 Philippines
In 2010, with a population of 93.3 million, the Philippines was the second most heavily populated among
the DA5 countries (Table 3, right). Its GDP ranked fourth at $0.118 trillion (Figure 42), and the level of its
GHG emissions, at slightly below 160 Mt CO2 equivalent, was the lowest among the DA5. The main sources
of GHG emissions were transportation services, 35%; fossil-fuel burning for electricity generation, 20%;
heavy industries, 10%; and rice and livestock production, 2.4% and 2.7%, respectively (Figure 44). Of
paramount importance in the country’s economic activity was the service sector, which at 55% had the
highest share of value added among the DA5 countries; industry and agriculture followed at 32% and 12%,
respectively.
In 2010 according to IEA (2012b), primary energy was actually sourced primarily from oil (34%), geothermal
(21%), coal (19%), biomass (17%), gas (8%), and hydropower (2%). In ICES, which excludes biomass and
geothermal power, the country’s primary energy consumption in 2010 was about 1.3 exajoule, sourced
mainly from oil, followed by coal and gas, while renewable sources only had a marginal role, accounting for

less than the 3% of energy consumption. The energy intensity and carbon intensity of the country’s GDP in
2010 were 0.011 and 0.76, respectively, and the emission per capita was 1 t CO2e.
For 2010–2050, the projected development trends for the Philippines would make it the third fastest
growing economy among the DA5. GDP is expected to reach $1.1 trillion in 2050, primarily supported by
the growth of the service sector; heavy industries would slightly increase their share in the total value
added. The contribution of agriculture to the total value added is expected to consistently shrink from the
initial 11% in 2010 to 7.7% in 2050. Given this development scenario, energy consumption is projected to
increase more than threefold over the next 40 years, peaking at 4.3 exajoule in 2050. The energy
consumption mix will remain dominated by fossil sources, which will account for over 90% of the total, with
hydropower expected to double by 2050.
Mirroring this development scenario, GHG emissions in the Philippines will increase from 150 Mt CO2
equivalent in 2010 to 400 Mt CO2 equivalent in 2050. Following the sectoral recomposition of the economy,
there will be an increase in share of emissions from transportation services, fossil-fuel based electricity,
heavy industry, and households. In contrast, the share of emissions by the agricultural sectors is projected
to decline from around 28% to 6.4%. Improvements in energy efficiency and productivity growth are
expected to foster reduction in the carbon intensity and energy intensity of country’s GDP by roughly 60%
between 2010 and 2050 (Figure 5).
Table 3: The Philippines’ Baseline Annualized GDP Growth Rate, 2011 -2050 (left) and
Population (right)
Population (million)
GDP (yearly growth rates)
ICES simulated Projections
2010
93.3
2011–2020
6.2%
6.0%
2020
109.7
2021–30
5.2%
5.5%
2030
126.3
2031–40
5.7%
5.5%
2040
141.7
2041–50
6.0%
5.5%
2050
154.9
Note: Projections refer to ADB (2011b) data, integrated with information from local experts

Figure 5: The Philippines’ Baseline Carbon and Energy Intensity, Levels* (left)
and Indexed, 2010 = 1 (right)
GDP = gross domestic product.
Note: *Carbon intensity expressed in MtCO2eq/$ billion (left axis), energy Intensity expressed as EJ/$
billion (right axis)

2.4 Thailand

In 2010, Thailand ranked second among the DA5 in terms of both GDP and GDP per capita. Its economic
structure was dominated by industry and services, with almost equal contributions to total value added at
43% and 45%, respectively. Agriculture accounted for roughly 12% of the total value added. In 2010, actual
primary energy consumption was dominated by oil (34%), gas (32%), biomass (19%), and coal (14%) (IEA,
2012b). In ICES, which omits biomass, the national energy consumption mix was dominated by oil at 43%
and gas at 39%, with coal making up the balance.
The largest source of emissions was electricity generation from fossil sources, followed by transportation
and industrial processes. The agricultural sector, primarily through rice cultivation, was also an important
source of emissions. In the baseline scenario, Thailand’s GDP is expected to exhibit rather uniform average
yearly growth rates, ranging from 4.1% to 4.6% (Table 4). By mid-century, national GDP is expected to reach
$1.2 trillion, an 6-fold increase from 2010. Alongside the growth of all sectors, heavy industries are
projected to grow in relative importance in the production of value added, but this will be at the expense
not only of agricultural activity but partly of services as well, with the former’s share in total value added
reduced from 12% in 2010 to 7.7% in 2050, and the latter’s share from 45% to 38.4%. To meet the
requirements of the fast-growing GDP of Thailand, the baseline scenario projects a primary energy
consumption of almost 10 exajoule in 2050, which is more than twice the 2010 levels.
All of Thailand’s primary energy requirements come from fossil sources, even if a slight fuel preference
favoring natural gas emerges after 2020. GHG emissions will then move toward a twofold increase during
the period. However, this will be lower in terms of the corresponding increase in the county’s GDP. Indeed,
both the carbon intensity and energy intensity of Thailand’s GDP are eventually expected to decline by
roughly 60% by 2050 (Figure 6).
Table 4: Thailand’s Baseline Annualized GDP Growth Rate, 2011 –2050 (left) and Population
(right)
Population (Millions
GDP (yearly growth rates)
)
ICES simulated Projections
2010
69.1
2011–2020
4.1%
4.2%
2020
72.1
2021–30
4.4%
4.2%
2030
73.3
2031–40
4.5%
4.3%
2040
73.0
2041–50
4.6%
4.2%
2050
71.0
Note: Projections refer to ADB (2011b) data, integrated with information from local experts

Figure 6: Thailand’s Baseline Carbon and Energy Intensity, Levels* (left) and Indexed, 2010 = 1
(right)
GDP = gross domestic product.
Note: *Carbon intensity expressed in MtCO2eq/$ billion (left axis), energy Intensity expressed as EJ/$
billion (right axis)

2.5 Viet Nam

In 2010, Viet Nam recorded a GDP of $69 billion, the lowest among the DA5, and a population of 87 million,
the third highest among them. In per capita terms, it was also the poorest economy in the DA5. Industry at
roughly 41% and services at 38% accounted for the bulk of total value added; agriculture at 21%
represented the highest agriculture share among the DA5. Total energy consumption amounted to 1.7
exajoule, 95% of which was provided by fossil sources, principally oil, and the remaining 5% by hydropower.
The country’s GHG emissions of 200 MtCO2 equivalent in 2010 were driven mainly by rice production,
heavy industry, electricity generation from fossil sources, and transportation services. The carbon intensity
and energy intensity of Viet Nam’s GDP are the highest across the DA5, and its emissions per capita
(excluding those from land use) place Viet Nam as fourth in the group.
In the 2010–2050 baseline, Viet Nam is expected to be the second fastest growing economy among the
DA5 (Table 5). Its GDP in 2050 could reach $1 trillion, or 14 times larger than in 2010. Economic growth is
found to be driven mainly by the development of the service sector and industry sector. The agriculture
sector is found to contribute a declining share of national value added, shrinking from 21% in 2010 to 10%
in 2050.
As a fast-growing economy, Viet Nam is found to experience a sharp increase in energy consumption in the
absence of climate-related policies (Figure A2.48). As with the rest of the DA5, Viet Nam’s energy
requirements are found to be mostly provided by fossil sources—oil, coal, and gas—although hydropower
grows to 0.41 exajoule in 2050. Overall GHG emissions are found to increase by 311% during the period.
Emissions from agriculture decline in relative importance until 2050, at which time they account for 6.8% of
the total. Emission shares of transportation services, industrial processes, electricity generation, and
household demand increase in the model. Even so, the emission growth rates in Viet Nam turn out to be
lower than the growth in GDP, such that the energy intensity and fossil fuel carbon intensity of GDP both
decline by 60% by 2050 (Figure 7).
Table 5: Viet Nam’s Baseline Annualized GDP Growth Rate, 2011 -2050 (left)
and Population (right)
Population (Million)
GDP (yearly growth rates)
2010
87.8
ICES simulated Projections
2020
97.2
2011–2020
6.8%
6.7%
2030
104.2
2021–30
7.6%
7.7%
2040
108.1
2031–40
7.2%
7.1%
2050
2041–50
6.5%
6.6%
110.0
Note: Projections refer to ADB (2011b) data, integrated with information from local experts.

Figure 7: Viet Nam’s Baseline Carbon and Energy Intensity, Levels (left) and Indexed, 2010 = 1
(right)
GDP = gross domestic product.

Note: *Carbon intensity expressed in MtCO2eq/$ billion (left axis), energy Intensity expressed as EJ/$
billion (right axis)

3. The climate scenarios
The intention of the scenarios modelled in this study is to represent alternative potential outcomes of the
UNFCCC climate negotiations, and to identify the implications of these outcomes for Southeast Asia. The
basic possibilities that are captured include:
1. Climate policies fail - Business as usual (climate action is not prioritized by any government)
2. International climate negotiations fail - Fragmented national climate policies (countries continue to
pursue national climate actions at their current level of ambition)
3. International climate agreement reached with moderate ambition (a global climate agreement
comes into place in 2020 with a moderate target)
4. International climate agreement reached with high ambition (a global climate agreement comes
into place in 2020 with an ambitious target)
As current UNFCCC negotiations target the post 2020 period for implementation of a global climate
agreement, the policy scenarios considered in this study have both a short-term and a long-term
dimension. The first period focuses on policy objectives that the South East Asian countries aim to pursue
by 2020 as stated in their respective official national plans. The second analyzes the implications of various
GHGs emission reduction strategies to be deployed after 2020 until the end of the century, assuming
different degrees of stringency and levels of global coordination.
To date, the only international expression of greenhouse gas emissions targets for developing countries in
Asia is through the 2009 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Copenhagen
Accord, which covers the period until 2020. This periodic round of climate negotiations under the auspices
of the UNFCCC aims to promote and facilitate dialogue on climate-change strategies among UN member
countries. It exhorts the major world emitters to pledge voluntary climate-change policy commitments for
the year 2020.1 These pledges are generally expressed with reference to different baseline years or to the
level of emissions in the absence of decarbonization actions (business as usual). Several countries or
regions committed to two sets of targets: a more ambitious target known as “high Copenhagen pledge”
and a less ambitious one known as “low Copenhagen pledge.” Both targets are considered in this study.
These Copenhagen pledges, expressed in terms of the 2020 policy scenarios, are described in Table 6.
Table 6: Copenhagen Pledges for 2020 Policy Scenarios
Region

Period of reference Low Cop Pledges High Cop Pledges

European Union
Japan
United States
Russia
Australia
New Zealand
Brazil

1990
1990
2005
1990
2000
1990
BAU

1

-20%
-25%
-17%
-15%
-5%
-10%
-36%

-30%
-25%
-25%
-20%
-39%

Annex I: http://unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagen_dec_2009/items/5264.php
Non-Annex I: http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_15/copenhagen_accord/items/5265.php

Mexico
Republic of Korea
Indonesia
Canada
South Africa
People’s Republic of China*
India*

BAU
BAU
BAU
2005
BAU
2005
2005

-30%
-30%
-26%
-17%
-34%
-40%
-20%

-45%
-25%

BAU = business as usual, CoP = Conference of Parties.
Source:

Note: *on carbon intensity of gross domestic product.
Among the DA5, only Indonesia came up with a pledge whose commitment falls within the Copenhagen
Accord—a 26% reduction in GHGs with respect to baseline emissions. The rest of the DA5 are still
formulating their climate change and energy policies that seek to promote decarbonization of their
respective economic systems so as to reduce the environmental impact of intense fossil-fuel use.
Table 7 describes the mitigation, energy efficiency, and carbon-efficiency targets of the policy scenarios of
four countries. The sources of these targets are their respective national official documents (Hoa et al.,
2010; IEA, 2010; Olz et al., 2010; Philippines Climate Change Commission, 2010; Vinluan, 2012).

Country
Malaysia
Philippines
Thailand
Viet Nam

Table 7: DA4 Country Decarbonization Targets for 2020
Target description
40% CO2eq emissions reduction per unit of GDP relative to 2005
(i.e., +19.8% CO2eq emissions increase from 2010)
CO2eq Emissions reduction from 10% energy savings from all sectors, 2009-2030
(i.e., -5.7% CO2eq emissions increase from 2010)
8% reduction of energy intensity by 2015 and 25% by 2030 compared with 2005
(i.e., +18.0% CO2eq emissions increase from 2010)
CO2eq Emissions reduction from total energy consumption savings by 3% to 5%
by 2010 and by 5% to 8% by 2015 compared with 2006
(i.e., +15.0% CO2eq emissions increase from 2010)

CO2eq = carbon dioxide equivalent, GDP = gross domestic product.
Sources: IEA, 2010; Olz et al., 2010; Vinluan, 2012; Hoa et al., 2010; Philippines Climate Change Commission, 2010
Note: In brackets is the target in terms of % change of GHG emissions with respect to 2010.

The country targets are expressed with different metrics: (i) in terms of emission reductions with respect to
the BAU for Indonesia; (ii) in terms of emission intensity of GDP compared to a reference year for Malaysia;
(iii) in terms of emission reduction and consequent energy saving strategies for the Philippines and Viet
Nam; and (iv) in terms of reduction in energy intensity for Thailand. To make these different country targets
comparable, they have been translated in Table 7 in terms of the common metrics for emission reduction
with respect to 2010. What follows are modeling results starting from the baseline emissions, emissions,
and energy intensity of the ICES model. Three long-term policy scenarios for the DA5 countries are
assessed.
The first is a fragmented scenario, which has been provided for benchmark comparison. It extrapolates to
the end of the century the “low pledge” stringency of the Copenhagen Accord with respect to further
carbon intensity improvements, and assumes that countries and regions will act domestically without the
possibility of emissions trade. In this setting, carbon prices are not equalized across regions, leading to
efficiency losses, in addition to the scenario not leading to the stabilization of the global climate.

The next two are long-term GHG concentration stabilization scenarios that aim by the end of the century to
concentrations of GHG gases plus aerosols of two levels, namely at 500 ppm carbon dioxide equivalent
(CO2eq) and 650 ppm CO2eq. The first and more stringent scenario, 500 ppm CO2eq, would lead to a
median temperature increase of 2°C with respect to preindustrial level by the end of the century; the
second scenario, 650 ppm CO2eq, to a median temperature increase of 2.4°C. The climate stabilization
scenario at 500 ppm is assumed to follow the high Copenhagen pledges in 2020, while the climate
stabilization scenario at 650 ppm is assumed to follow the low Copenhagen pledges.
The GHG concentration stabilization goals are implemented assuming full global cooperation in the form of
an international quota system supported by global trading of grandfathered permits. Regional and country
allowances are determined according to “contraction and convergence” criteria; that is, allowances are
initially calculated considering the share of each country of total GHG emissions in 2020 (including land use
and peatland), which then linearly tend to a per-capita criterion that is fully implemented in 2050.
In the climate stabilization scenarios, emission reductions that are generated by avoided deforestation
produce credits that can be traded in the carbon market, provided that a country or region emits less than
its allocated target. In the fragmented scenario, countries can use emissions from avoided deforestation to
comply with their domestic targets, but cannot trade them.
As the role of REDD in future carbon markets is still not decided (see Box 3), and the performance of REDD
is not well understood, different assumptions on the feasibility of REDD activities are introduced. This is
particularly important for Indonesia and Malaysia (the two DA5 countries assumed to directly undertake
REDD within this study) as well as also more generally relevant to global climate policy in the context of the
potential supply of REDD reduction from Latin American countries. In a “Higher REDD cost” case, the cost of
implementing REDD activities is assumed to increase by 150% with respect to that used as the standard in
the models. This specific increase takes into account, in addition to opportunity costs, the transaction costs,
potential project failures, and leakage that could result from overoptimistic reference levels or from REDD
activities that simply displace deforestation or substitution effect. In the “No REDD” case, REDD is excluded
altogether. Table 8 summarizes the seven policy scenarios considered.

Table 8: Definitions of the Policy Scenarios in the Present Study

Scenario matrix

POLICY
IMPLEMENTATION

BAU

All
GHGs,
Full
REDD 1 (BAU)
potential
All
GHGs,
higher REDD
cost

POLICY STRINGENCY
International
Climate
Fragmented
Agreement
(high ambition)
High
Copenhagen
Low Copenhagen
Pledges in 2020
Pledges in 2020
and long-term
and
GHG
extrapolation
concentration
thereafter
at 500 ppm
CO2 eq
2
(Fragmentation)

International
Climate
Agreement
(mid ambition)
Low
Copenhagen
Pledges in 2020
and long-term
GHG
concentration
at 650 ppm
CO2 eq

3 (500 ppm-eq 4 (650 ppm-eq
High REDD)
High REDD)
5 (500 ppm-eq 6 (650 ppm-eq
Low REDD)
Low REDD)

All GHGs, No
REDD

7 (500 ppm-eq 8 (650 ppm-eq
No REDD)
No REDD)

BAU = business as usual, eq = equivalent, GHG = greenhouse gas, ppm = parts per million, REDD = reduced
emissions from forest degradation and deforestation.

4. Results
This section presents country-specific results that exploit the higher sectoral detail offered by the ICES
model. In this section, the analysis of decarbonization policy costs is divided into (i) a 2020 assessment that
investigates the implications of short-term targets for DA5 countries, and (ii) a long-term assessment that
delves on the economic consequences of long-term decarbonization paths. In so doing, it should be
recognized the ICES model assumes both exogenous technical progress and a quite rigid structure for its
energy generation system, with limited options for decarbonizing the economic system. For this reason, the
estimated long-term policy costs yielded by the ICES model can be expected to be biased upwards over
long timeframes, as many dynamics that reduce decarbonization costs are omitted. However it does offer
insights into the distribution of economic effects among different sectors, which is valuable, even if the
level of GDP costs that it generates over long timeframes should be interpreted with caution.

4.1 Indonesia’s 2020 Emissions Reduction Target
The 2020 target for Indonesia is a 26% reduction of GHGs with respect to baseline emissions (Figure 8). For
Indonesia, reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) availability has a great
influence in determining how those goals are achieved in terms of carbon intensity and energy intensity as
well as overall energy consumption levels. Under “perfectly efficient” full REDD, Indonesia could leave
these energy consumption levels almost unchanged with respect to the BAU. This is because the required
emission reduction for Indonesia can be attained almost entirely through REDD actions without strongly
affecting the country’s energy and/or industrial system.
If REDD is not perfectly efficient, and faces higher costs for transactions and leakage payments (+150% with
respect to BAU) or become totally unavailable, Indonesia’s carbon intensity of GDP is reduced by 8% and
56%, and energy consumption by 7.5% and 60%, respectively. The energy consumption mix is affected as a
result, with 2020 wind and solar production 30% higher than in the BAU. However, given that the BAU
share of wind and solar energy generation in 2020 is very low, the contribution to total energy production
remains minor. There remains rigidity in demand for oil and oil products, as a result of a lack of substitutes
within the transportation sector. There is a large difference in abatement behavior between the high REDD
cost case and the no-REDD case. This is partially due to the low-cost abatement option of peatland
rewetting and rehabilitation, which remains possible even in the context of raised REDD costs, but not in a
climate regime that excludes REDD.

4.2 Indonesia in the Long-term Stabilization Scenarios
Emissions reductions pathways
Figure 8 represents the stringency of the different stabilization targets for Indonesia as a result of the
intersection of global carbon prices and domestic abatement costs. The 500 parts per million (ppm)
scenario
leads to an emission reduction of 56%–61% by midcentury, depending on the use of REDD, while the 650
ppm scenario leads to an emission reduction of 32%–37%. The fragmented (FRAG) scenario is projected to
attain the same percentage of emission reduction during 2020 through 2050. The possibility of selling REDD
credits in the carbon market provides an incentive for Indonesia to reduce its emission more than in the noREDD case. This pattern is more evident in the midterm than in the long term, given that the BAU land-use
emission trends rise initially and then decline.
Mechanisms of emissions reductions
Both the 500 ppm and 650 ppm decarbonization scenarios imply large carbon and energy intensity
declines—

roughly 60% and 35%, respectively, by 2050 compared to BAU. In the absence of REDD, a massive reduction
in energy consumption implies stronger contractions in the use of all fossil energy sources. The primary
energy consumption mix reflects a continuation of the trend highlighted in 2020, as oil has few substitutes.
By 2050, oil is expected to constitute almost 80% of energy consumption in the 500 scenario and 75% in the
650 scenario, while coal is reduced to 7%, with hydropower also having a 2% share (regardless of REDD
assumptions). The lower stringency of the fragmented target induces less change in the energy mix, despite
increases in the share of oil from the BAU 45% to 60% in 2050. In the no-REDD case, growth of wind and
solar production is increased .
Economic contributions of carbon trade
After 2020, prices in the global carbon market steadily increase following the increasing stringency imposed
by the stabilization scenarios, reaching $495/tCO2eq and $205/tCO2eq in 2050 in the 500 ppm and 650
ppm stabilization scenarios, respectively. In 2050, the supply of REDD credits allows the global cost of
carbon allowances to be lower at $495/tCO2eq against almost $554/tCO2eq in the no-REDD case.
Indonesia’s position in the global carbon market is dependent on REDD. In the REDD case, the country
remains a net seller in the 650 ppm stabilization scenario until 2034 and in the 500 stabilization scenario
until 2029. Consistent with the carbon prices, revenues are higher in the 500 case. When REDD is not
available, Indonesia is always a buyer of permits, with increasing volumes until 2045. Then its purchases
tend to stabilize. This is the combined effect of the initial stringency of the historically rooted goal and the
rise in allowance allocation as a result of the contraction and convergence framework.
Economic consequences of emissions reductions
Ultimately, Indonesian GDP costs reach 9.4% and 12.5% in the full REDD and no REDD cases, respectively, in
the 500 stabilization. They are lower in the 650 stabilization, ranging between 2.9% for the full REDD case
and 4.6% for the no-REDD case. REDD exerts larger impacts before 2030, when deforestation is most rapid
and fall once clearance has finished. In 2030, for instance, REDD would reduce Indonesia’s 500
decarbonization cost from 7.4% of GDP to 2.9%.
Costs are less sensitive to REDD by mid-century for the most adversely affected sectors. By 2050, fossil fuel
industries would be losing 57% and 35%, and the industrial sector 17% and 9% of their production in the
500 and 650 stabilization scenarios, respectively, with respect to the baseline with both full and no-REDD
The service sector benefits from REDD activities. Its losses in 2050 would be roughly half of those in the noREDD case.
REDD strongly conditions sectoral impacts and offers good potential for Indonesia to reduce emissions at
low economic cost, especially for particular sectors. The agricultural sector benefits from REDD. The likely
reduction in the expansion of agricultural area due to REDD, a development that could constrain
agricultural activities, is more than compensated for by the beneficial effect on Indonesia’s GDP of selling
REDD credits in the carbon market. Although agricultural sector production losses in the no-REDD case are
3.8% and 0.2% with respect to the baseline by 2050 in the 500 and 650 stabilization scenarios, respectively,
there are gains in the full REDD case of 3.3% and 3.6% in the 650 and 500 stabilization scenarios.

Figure 8: Indonesia GHG emissions Changes from Baseline with Full REDD (top), Low REDD
(middle) and No REDD (bottom), Quantity (left), % Change from bau (right)
bau = business as usual, ccs = carbon capture and storage, frag = fragmented (policy), redd = reduced emissions from
forest degradation and deforestation.

Figure 9: Primary Energy Mix Projections for Indonesia, Full REDD (top), Higher REDD cost
(middle), No-REDD (bottom)
bau = business as usual, ccs = carbon capture and storage, frag = fragmented (policy), REDD = reduced
emissions from forest degradation and deforestation.

Figure 10: Projections of Carbon Permits Trade in Indonesia, Full REDD (top), Higher REDD Cost
(center), No REDD (bottom) (> 0 selling < 0 buying)
REDD = reduced emissions from forest degradation and deforestation.

Figure 11 – Real GDP and Sectoral Value Added in Indonesia, Value (left), % Change from bau
(right)
bau = business as usual, frag = fragmented (policy), REDD = reduced emissions from forest degradation and
deforestation.

4.3 Malaysia’s 2020 Emissions Reductions Targets
The 2020 target for Malaysia is a 40% CO2 eq. emissions reduction per unit of GDP from 2005 levels. Given
that the baseline emissions growth path to 2020 leads to a similar level of decarbonization in ICES as the
target, the target does not imply substantial emissions reduction, compared with business as usual.
However, minor differences can be noted in sectoral production, with slight generalized gains.
This is the effect of international spillovers to Malaysia from the actions of other countries. Malaysia can
pursue its baseline trend when other countries have committed to voluntary emission reductions that are
more stringent. This can produce leakage effects that benefit countries do not reduce emissions compared
with business as usual.

4.4 Malaysia in the Long-term Stabilization Scenarios
Emissions reductions pathways
Figure 12 shows the level of emission reduction achieved according to the intersection of Malaysia’s
abatement costs and global carbon prices. The 500 ppm scenario leads to an emission reduction of 70% in
2050 compared with BAU. The 650 ppm scenario leads to a reduction of 40%, while the fragmented
scenario leads to almost no emission reduction compared with the BAU by midcentury. Malaysia’s GDP
carbon intensity and energy intensity closely follow the country’s emission trends resulting in the highest
percentage reduction among the DA5 with respect to BAU. This is a direct consequence of the country’s
higher carbon intensity. In a global carbon market, which allows the possibility to allocate abatement
where it is cheaper, higher intensity reductions often accrue in countries with the highest carbon intensity.
Mechanisms of emissions reductions
To achieve the 70% emission reduction against BAU implied by the 500 ppm stabilization scenario in 2050,
primary energy consumption in 2050 falls below 2010 levels. Although the 650 ppm stabilization scenario is
less stringent, it still implies energy consumption 40% lower than BAU in 2050 (Figure 13). The mix in
primary energy consumption shows a shift toward oil and oil products—which increase their share in
energy
from 40% in the 2050 BAU to 61% and 67% in the 650 ppm scenario and 500 ppm stabilization scenario,
respectively. The contribution of natural gas and coal to energy consumption falls, while hydropower
increases, but remains below 2.5%. In contrast, solar and wind production sharply increase, but their
contribution to energy generation remains small (0.4%). In the absence of REDD, fossil fuel power use
declines and renewable energy increases in the stabilization scenarios.
Economic contributions of carbon trade
In the carbon market, Malaysia is a net buyer of permits and behaves very similarly across the full REDD,
the
low REDD, and the no-REDD scenarios (Figure 15). Due to the increasing stringency of the target and the
higher carbon prices, the country requires higher expenditure to import permits in the 500 than in the 650
stabilization scenarios.
Economic consequences of emissions reductions
Ultimately, Malaysia’s GDP costs are at the higher end of the DA5. In the 500 stabilization scenario for
2050, they range from 10.4% to 12.4% loss in the full REDD and no-REDD cases, respectively. They are much
lower in the 650 stabilization, ranging from 3.2% of the full REDD case to 4% of the no-REDD case. As in the
case of Indonesia, the use of REDD exerts larger impacts on Malaysia before 2030, when the bulk of

deforestation activities that have taken place in the past become less relevant in the longer term. In 2030,
REDD reduces Malaysia’s 500 decarbonization cost from 4.6% to 3% of GDP.
In common with Indonesia, the Malaysian agricultural sector benefits from REDD. For both the 500 and 650
stabilization scenarios, the expected loss by the sector is lower in the full REDD than in the no-REDD case.
REDD allows Malaysia to import and spend less in emission permits as well as to reduce GDP contraction,
maintaining overall demand for agricultural commodities and other products. This is in keeping with a
general trend that all sectors would be slightly better off (through lower production contraction) in the full
REDD than in the no-REDD case.
Fossil-fuel producing sectors are the most adversely affected (production contraction of -65% and -40% in
the 500 and 650 stabilization scenarios, respectively). The services sector (which includes transport) is next
most affected, followed by industry, and agriculture when REDD is absent. However, agriculture has minor
negative impacts when REDD is in place.

Figure 12 - GHG Emission Projections for Malaysia, Quantity (left), % Change over bau (right) for
Full REDD (top), higher REDD cost (middle), no REDD (bottom)
bau = business as usual, frag = fragmented (policy), REDD = reduced emissions from forest degradation and
deforestation.

Figure 13 - Primary Energy Mix Projections for Malaysia, Full REDD (top), Higher REDD cost
(middle), No-REDD (bottom)
bau = business as usual, ccs = carbon capture and storage, frag = fragmented (policy), REDD = reduced
emissions from forest degradation and deforestation.

Figure 14 – Real GDP and Sectoral Value Added for Malaysia, Value (left), % Change from bau
(right)
bau = business as usual.

Figure 15: Projections of Carbon Permits Trade in Malaysia (> 0 selling < 0 buying)
REDD = reduced emissions from forest degradation and deforestation.

4.5 Philippines’ 2020 Emissions Reduction Targets
The interpreted goal (based on energy sector targets) for the Philippines is 5.7% reduction of CO2 emissions
in 2030 compared with 2010 levels. This amounts to an ambitious emission reduction of roughly 30% in
2020 compared with the BAU level (Figure 16), which is the most stringent among the DA5 countries’
objectives for 2020. In the Philippines, BAU deforestation is not substantial, which results in carbon and
energy intensity being the same across the full, higher-cost, and no-REDD cases. To meet the stated goal,
carbon and energy intensity are expected to decline after 2010 and to achieve in 2020 levels that are 34%
and 31% lower than BAU, respectively. Total energy consumption declines by 30% in 2020 compared with
BAU. The energy consumption mix reflects a larger share of oil and a crowding out of coal. Gas and
hydropower shares of energy consumption remain unaffected. Renewable energy production from wind
and solar doubles from the 2020 BAU. However, this remains small in absolute terms, as the BAU value is
tiny. The hydropower sector slightly declines in production compared with BAU because of reduced power
demand from energy-intensive sectors, although this decline is much smaller than for fossil fuels.

4.6 Philippines in the long-term stabilization scenarios

Emissions reductions pathways
Figure 16 represents the stringency of the different stabilization targets for the Philippines. The 500 ppm
scenario leads to an emission reduction of 50%, while the 650 ppm scenario leads to a reduction of 20%.
The fragmented scenario turns out to be more stringent than the 650 ppm scenario, as the extrapolated
domestic commitments are greater than those triggered by global carbon prices, even with the Philippines
as a net seller of permits.
Mechanisms of emissions reductions
Both the 500 ppm and 650 ppm decarbonization scenarios imply large carbon and energy intensity declines
of 55% and 43%, respectively by 2050, with little sensitivity to different assumptions about REDD. Similarly,
energy consumption falls by 45% and 21% compared with BAU levels in 2050 in the 500 and 650
stabilizations, respectively. Oil is the dominant energy source in all scenarios (Figure 17). In the Philippines,
this tendency is particularly extreme and in 2050, energy consumption is expected to be dominated by oil
with a significant share of solar and wind (7.4%), a 3.4% share of hydropower and a negligible amount of

coal. Gas is phased out. The fragmented scenario implies a 31% and 27% reduction in carbon and energy
intensity, respectively, over BAU levels in 2050, and a 30% reduction in total energy consumption. In the
absence of REDD, coal and gas energy use declines, and solar and hydropower are increased.
Economic contributions of carbon trade
With higher carbon prices in the 500 ppm than in the 650 ppm stabilization scenario, total revenues from
exports of carbon permits are also higher in the former, with $140 billion in the full REDD case in 2050
(Figure 18). If REDD credits are not allowed to enter the global carbon market, increased carbon prices will
raise carbon permit export values to $160 billion in 2050. Under 650 ppm stabilization, 2050 permit sales
are approximately $110 billion.

Economic consequences of emissions reductions
GDP costs in the Philippines are estimated to reach -2.6%, -1.7% and 3.3% with respect to the baseline in
2050 in the fragmented, 650 and 500 stabilization scenarios respectively (Figure 19). It is interesting to note
that the 650 stabilization scenario depicts lower costs than 2020 target until 2047, while the 500
stabilization scenario until 2028. This illustrates that the 2020 goal for the Philippines is relatively stringent.
The long term trends in sectoral production mimic what is observed in 2020, with a notable exception of
the services sector. In 2050, industrial sector contracts (-28.3%, -17.4% in the 500 and 650 stabilizations
respectively, with little sensitivity to REDD) followed by agriculture (-7.5%, -2.7%) in the 500 and 650
stabilizations, respectively). Clearly, the burden of the reduction falls primarily on carbon and energy
intensive sectors. The service sector on the contrary, after a slight 2020 contraction with respect to the
baseline grows more rapidly to be ultimately 13.5% and 10.8% higher than the baseline in the 500 and 650
stabilizations scenarios respectively. The Philippines has the highest baseline share of total value added
from services among the DA5 group. The stabilization regime thus has relatively large potential to recompose of economic activity towards that important sector. Given that the services sector usually grows
in importance as economies develop, this also means that decarbonization can actually help to foster the
expansion of sectors of the Philippine economy that are most vital to long-term development.

Figure 16 - GHG Emission Projections for the Philippines, Quantity (left), % Change over bau
(right) for Full REDD (top). higher REDD cost (middle), no REDD (bottom).
bau = business as usual, frag = fragmented (policy), REDD = reduced emissions from forest degradation and
deforestation.

Figure 17 - Primary Energy Mix Projections for the Philippines , Full REDD (top), Higher REDD
cost (middle), No-REDD (bottom)
bau = business as usual, ccs = carbon capture and storage, frag = fragmented (policy), REDD = reduced emissions from
forest degradation and deforestation.

Figure 18 - Projections of Carbon Permits Trade in the Philippines , Full REDD (top), Higher REDD
Cost (middle), No REDD (bottom) (> 0 selling < 0 buying)
REDD = reduced emissions from forest degradation and deforestation.

Figure 19 – Real GDP and sectoral Value Added in the Philippines, Value (left), % Change from
bau (right)
bau = business as usual, frag = fragmented (policy), REDD = reduced emissions from forest degradation and
deforestation.

4.6 Thailand’s 2020 Emissions Reduction Targets
Thailand’s policy target consists in a reduction in energy intensity of GDP by 8% by 2015 and 25% by 2030,
compared with 2005 levels. These goals are similar to how Thailand is already performing in the baseline,
according to ICES. Therefore, carbon and energy intensities do not diverge significantly from baseline levels,
so that the energy mix is unchanged. This would also imply very little additional action and low cost for the
country to meet its policy objectives.
Furthermore, the model finds that Thailand, due to the low level of decarbonization effort compared with
the baseline scenario, can benefit from spillover effects from decarbonization in the rest of the world, and
could become relatively more competitive. Eventually, the country can experience a small GDP increase
especially in the no REDD case when the Copenhagen abatement effort imposes other countries a relatively
higher decarbonization action. The benefiting sectors are industry (0.4%), services (0.5%) and agriculture
with an increase of 0.1% (mainly rice and livestock) with respect to the baseline.

4.7 Thailand in the long-term stabilization scenarios
Emissions reductions pathways
Figure 20 shows the level of emission reduction achieved according to the intersection of Thailand’s
abatement costs and global carbon prices. The 500 ppm scenario leads to emission reduction of 60%–63%,
depending on the presence of REDD credits in the carbon market by 2050. The 650 ppm scenario leads to
emission reduction of 31%–33%. In the fragmented scenario, Thailand will continue to benefit from its
nonstringent target with negative costs that reach 5% with respect to BAU in 2050. However, both the 500
ppm and 650 ppm decarbonization scenarios imply large carbon and energy intensity declines (Figure
A2.42) of roughly 60% and 30%, respectively, by 2050, with little sensitivity to different assumptions about
REDD. This implies significant cuts in energy consumption of 60% and 30% compared with BAU levels in
2050 in the 500 and 650 stabilizations, respectively.
Mechanisms of emissions reductions
In terms of primary energy, oil is the fossil fuel that is least sensitive to emissions policies. All energy
sources decline in quantity but the share of oil increases to constitute almost 70% of energy consumption
in the 500 ppm scenario and 62% in the 650 ppm scenario (Figure 21). Coal is reduced to 5% and
hydropower to 3.8% in the energy mix. The fragmented scenario is much less ambitious. The changes in
2050 compared with BAU levels include only a 3.5% reduction of carbon and energy intensity with no
reduction in total energy consumption compared with BAU levels. In the climate stabilization scenarios,
solar and wind energy increase but remain with very small shares of the mix. In contrast, hydropower
consumption increases substantially by 170% in the 650 ppm stabilization and 200% in the 500 ppm
stabilization. In the absence of REDD, coal and gas energy use declines.
Economic contributions of carbon trade
Thailand remains a net buyer of permits throughout the period. The country would buy more than $28
billion of permits in 2050 under 650 ppm and $33 billion under 500 ppm by 2050. In quantity, this implies
138 and 67 MtCO2eq in 650 ppm and 500 ppm, respectively (Figure 22).
Economic consequences of emissions reductions
After 2020, costs to GDP increase substantially, with 3% for 650 and 12.6% for 500 scenarios with REDD in
place at low cost (Figure 23). The availability of REDD credits from other countries lowers the costs in 2050
(3% vs. 4.3% and 12.6% vs. 15% in the 650 and 500, respectively).
At the sectoral level, stabilization scenarios would entail larger production contraction in heavy industry.
Services and agriculture are affected similarly.

Figure 20 - GHG Emission Projections for Thailand, Quantity (left), % Change over bau (right) for
Full REDD (top), higher REDD cost (middle), no REDD (bottom)
bau = business as usual, frag = fragmented (policy), REDD = reduced emissions from forest degradation and
deforestation.

Figure 21 - Primary Energy Mix Projections for Thailand, Full REDD (top), Higher REDD cost
(middle), No-REDD (bottom)
bau = business as usual, ccs = carbon capture and storage, frag = fragmented (policy), REDD = reduced
emissions from forest degradation and deforestation.

Figure 22 - Projections of Carbon Permits Trade in Thailand, Full REDD (top), Higher REDD Cost
(middle), No REDD (bottom) (> 0 selling < 0 buying)
REDD = reduced emissions from forest degradation and deforestation.

Figure 23 – Real GDP and Sectoral Value Added in Thailand, Value (left), % Change from bau
(right)
bau = business as usual, frag = fragmented (policy), REDD = reduced emissions from forest degradation and
deforestation.

4.9 Viet Nam’s 2020 emissions reduction targets
Viet Nam has planned several programs and policies to promote clean development and low-carbon
growth. The 2012 National Green Growth Strategy (VGGS) aims to reduce energy emissions by 10% below
BAU by 2020. Viet Nam also set a goal to reduce overall energy use by 5% to 8% by 2015, compared with
2006 in its National Energy Development Strategy.
To translate these national objectives into concrete policies, the analysis of Hoa et al. (2010) is followed.
The interpreted level of ambition of the Viet Nam target, as presented in Figure A2.52, shows a reduction in
emissions of 20% with respect to BAU in 2020. Primary energy consumption is reduced by 25%, with
considerable contraction in coal use from 0.9 to 0.5 exajoules (a decline of 43%).

4.10 Viet Nam in the Long-term Stabilization Scenarios
Emissions reductions pathways
Figure 24 shows the level of emission reduction achieved according to the intersection of Viet Nam’s
abatement costs and global carbon prices. By 2050, the 500 scenario leads to an emission reduction of 63%,
while the 650 scenario leads to a 35% reduction. The fragmented scenario retains 2020 targets to 2050,
keeping the reduction constant at 20% during the period. Both the 500 ppm and 650 ppm decarbonization
scenarios imply large carbon and energy intensity declines, which are approximately 70% for the 500 ppm
scenario and 40% for 650 ppm by 2050. These results are insensitive to different assumptions on REDD.
Mechanisms of emissions reductions
Although all primary energy sources are reduced in quantity, the share of oil increases and is expected to
constitute nearly 52% of energy consumption in the 500 ppm and 650 ppm scenarios by 2050. The
production of wind electricity increases by 65% in 2050 in the 500 full-REDD scenario compared with BAU.
The fragmented scenario results in less restructuring of the energy mix in 2050, as coal declines from 32%
to 17%, while oil increases from 41% to 52% (Figure 25). In the absence of REDD, coal and gas energy use
declines, but effects on renewable energy are minor.
Economic contributions of carbon trade
Viet Nam is a net exporter of permits, initially with modest quantities, but then becoming an important
seller (compared with the other DA5 countries). Traded values by 2050 range from $10 billion to $26
billion, implying 51 MtCO2eq and 53 MtCO2eq in 650 ppm full-REDD and 500 ppm no-REDD scenarios,
respectively (Figure 26).
Economic consequences of emissions reductions
GDP costs relative to baseline under the 500 scenario increase through 2030 to 6.4% with REDD and 8.7%
without it, after which the rate of increase declines to reach 2.6% and 5.3% respectively in 2050. Under the
650 scenario, costs do not exceed those of the fragmented scenario reaching 0.6% in 2050 vs 2.7% of the
fragmented (Figure 27).
Higher costs are experienced by the more emissions intensive sectors, heavy industry with a contraction of
6.7%. The services sector declines by 0.2% in the 500 REDD scenario, but much of this decline is an artifact
of reduction in use of fossil fuel powered transport. In contrast, the policy burden only marginally affects
agriculture, especially rice and livestock, with a slight decrease.

Figure 24 - GHG Emission Projections for Viet Nam, Quantity (left), % Change over bau (right)
for Full REDD (top). higher REDD cost (middle), no REDD (bottom)
bau = business as usual, frag = fragmented (policy), REDD = reduced emissions from forest degradation and
deforestation.

Figure 25 - Primary Energy Mix Projections for Viet Nam, Full REDD (top), Higher REDD cost
(middle), No-REDD (bottom)
bau = business as usual, ccs = carbon capture and storage, frag = fragmented (policy), REDD = reduced emissions from
forest degradation and deforestation.

Figure 26 - Projections of Carbon Permits Trade in Viet Nam, Full REDD (top), Higher REDD Cost
(middle), No REDD (bottom) (> 0 selling < 0 buying)
REDD = reduced emissions from forest degradation and deforestation.

Figure 27 – Real GDP and Sectoral Production in Viet Nam, Value (left), % Change from bau
(right)
bau = business as usual, frag = fragmented (policy), REDD = reduced emissions from forest degradation and
deforestation.

5. Conclusions
The Southeast Asian region is particularly exposed to climatic changes and vulnerable to their adverse
consequences, with expected economic losses that are much higher than the world average. In this context,
it is critical to improve understanding of decarbonization dynamics, costs, and potentials. Prior mitigation
policy cost assessments provide little detail on effects for Southeast Asia, and often do not reflect potential
global mitigation policy timing and arrangements. Moreover, crucial characteristics, such as peat emissions
for Indonesia, are often omitted or mischaracterized. There are in fact important commonalities, as well as
substantial differences, in these country responses to climate stabilization policies.
The level of overall reduction that occurs is sensitive to REDD only in Indonesia. A majority of cumulative
emissions reduction (55%–68%) under 500 ppm stabilization occurs even under the less stringent 650 ppm
target across all the countries. The policy costs are highest in Viet Nam and Thailand in the case of REDD
and are highest in Indonesia in the case of no REDD, where REDD allows GDP costs to be halved over the
period. However, in all countries, REDD helps to lower GDP costs of climate stabilization. Given that
Indonesia is by far the largest emitter in the region, this highlights the critical need for reduction of
deforestation for the region’s role in climate stabilization at acceptable cost, even if the global stabilization
target is not highly stringent.
Similarly, Indonesia can export a cumulative discounted $288 billion of carbon credits with REDD in place
under a 500 ppm scenario; these exports virtually disappear when REDD is absent. In the absence of REDD,
however, other major carbon credit exporters in the region respond to globally higher carbon prices and
increase exports. Although the Philippines has the highest unit GDP cost for emissions reduction, it has the
highest export value relative to GDP. This is due to two factors: its baseline emissions growth is lower than
that of the other countries while at the same time its baseline population growth is higher than that of
other countries. Given that the emissions allocation criterion is based on emissions per capita this implies
that it has excess permits to sell.
However, REDD also requires upfront investment in policies and institutions. The forestry sector in
Southeast Asia currently has many problems of tenure, perverse incentives, and corruption. Building
institutions appropriate to REDD requires political will and substantial investment to foster procedures and
standards that reflect consensus, fairness and accountability. Much effort is still needed to identify a mix of
measures that ensure that REDD is effective, efficient and equitable.
Industry is the most heavily affected sector across the countries, although Thailand has little differentiation
in impacts among sectors under 500 ppm stabilization. Agriculture is positively affected when REDD is
present in Indonesia, as are services in the Philippines, while industry is particularly negatively affected in
the latter. The presence of REDD generally reduces policy costs for industry and services in all countries.
Global and coordinated action is found to be critical to the cost effectiveness of emissions stabilization
policies. Coordination, in the form of a carbon market, allows abatement to be concentrated where it is
cheapest, so as to minimize total abatement cost. As a result, 650 stabilization has a similar cost to the
region to current fragmented targets, but achieves much higher levels of emissions reductions.
Finally, the analysis also showed that only some of the countries have short-term emissions targets that are
consistent with a stabilization scenario at 650ppm: these are Indonesia, Philippines and Viet Nam. None of
the countries’ mid-term targets are coherent with more ambitious stabilization scenario at 500ppm.
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Appendix
The ICES model: basic structure
ICES is a recursive-dynamic CGE model. It solves recursively a sequence of static equilibria linked by
endogenous investment determining the growth of capital stock from 2004 to 2050. The calibration year is
2004. As in all CGE models, ICES makes use of the Walrasian perfect competition paradigm to simulate
adjustment processes, although the inclusion of some elements of imperfect competition is also possible.
Industries are modeled through representative firms, minimizing costs while taking prices as given. In turn,
output prices are given by average production costs. Production functions are specified via a series of
nested CES functions. Domestic and foreign inputs are imperfect substitutes, according to the so-called
“Armington” assumption.
The Economy
A representative consumer in each region receives income, defined as the service value of national primary
factors (natural resources, land, labor, and capital). Capital and labor are perfectly mobile domestically, but
immobile internationally. Land and natural resources are industry-specific. The income is used to finance
three classes of expenditure: aggregate household consumption, public consumption, and savings (see
Figure 28). The expenditure shares are generally fixed, as the top-level utility function has a Cobb-Douglas
specification.

Figure 28: ICES Model Nested Consumption Function

Public consumption is split in a series of alternative consumption items, also according to a Cobb-Douglas
specification. However, almost all expenditure is actually concentrated in one specific industry: non-market
services.
Private consumption is analogously split in a series of alternative composite Armington aggregates. These
postulate the imperfect substitutability across domestic and imported commodities. However, the
functional specification used at this level is the Constant Difference in Elasticities form: a non-homothetic
function, which is used to account for possible differences in income elasticities for the various
consumption goods.

Investment is internationally mobile: savings from all regions are pooled and then investment is allocated
so as to achieve equality of expected rates of return to capital. As a result, savings and investments are
equalized at the world, but not at the regional, level. Because of accounting identities, any financial
imbalance mirrors a trade deficit or surplus in each region.
The ICES production tree, represented by each node in the tree, combines single or composite factors of
production in a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function.
All sectors use primary factors such as labor and capital-energy, and intermediate inputs. In some sectors
(fossil fuel extraction industries and fishery), primary factors include natural resources (e.g., fossil fuels or
fish) and land. The nested production structure depicted in Figure 29 is the same across all sectors, and
diversity in production processes as well as technologies is captured through sector-specific productivity
and substitution elasticity parameters.
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Figure 29: ICES Model Nested Production Function

The regional specification singles out Indonesia and considers “rest of Southeast Asia” (SEA). This allows
more specific analysis of the economic implications of medium- and long-term decarbonization policies in
these country/region. Most relevant international players, globally and in the area, have been also
distinguished to highlight trade patterns and policy spillover effects from the region. The production tree
emphasizes energy-producing sectors, given that they are the major industries impacted by
mitigation/decarbonization policies. The depiction of agriculture and of “other industries and services”
remains less detailed, although agriculture singles out the timber sector, which can be more directly
affected by deforestation patterns.

Table 9: Regional and Sectoral Detail of the ICES Model
Countries/Regions
Organisation for Economic CoNon-OECD
Developing Asia

operation and Development
(OECD)
United States (USA)
WEURO (15 European Union
Member States)
EEURO (12 European Union
Member States)
KOSAU (Republic of Korea, South
Africa, Australia)
CAJANZ (Canada, Japan, Australia,
New Zealand)

Agriculture/Land Use
Rice
Other Crops
Vegetables and Fruits
Livestock
Timber

Economies in transition (TE)
Middle East and North Africa
(MENA)
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)

Indonesia
Malaysia

South Asia (SASIA)

Thailand

India

Vietnam

People’s Republic of China (PRC)
Rest of Southeast Asia (SEA)
Latin America (LACA)
Sectors
Energy
Coal
Crude Oil
Natural Gas
Petroleum Products
Nuclear
Hydro
Solar
Wind
Other Electricity

Philippines

Others
Heavy Industry
Light Industry
Services

Biofuels
The Energy Sector
Renewable energy sources (hydro, solar, wind) are stand-alone sectors providing electricity to the rest of
the economic system. The intermittency of solar and wind is accounted for by low substitution with other
energy sources, which limits their penetration over time in the energy mix.
Biofuels are transformation sectors processing the output of the agricultural “Other Crops” sector and
selling output (biofuels) to the “Services” sector that includes retail sale of automotive fuels. Nuclear
energy is an alternative option for base-load energy, along with coal but with lower substitution than
between coal and other fossil fuels (oil, gas), so that it is represented in a nest above coal.

Other GHGs and Land Use
Avoided deforestation is introduced as an additional abatement option. Country-specific equations link
different carbon prices to different abatement levels that can be accomplished by REDD practices. The
parameterization of these equations derives from the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
(IIASA) model cluster (Gusti et al., 2008) prepared for the Eliasch (2008) report. The cluster model,
however, does not specify REDD abatement opportunities for Indonesia, only for Southeast Asia as a whole.
Country abatement has been estimated by downscaling Southeast Asia data proportionally to the national
share of emission from deforestation in the regional total.

Avoided deforestation, triggered by sufficiently high carbon prices, impacts agriculture, forestry, and
pasture land use. In particular, lower deforestation might imply a lower expansion of land for farming and
grazing. This effect is also considered, and the relation between lower emissions from REDD, lower number
of hectares deforested, and lower expansion of agricultural land has been estimated by coupling the data
from the IIASA cluster model with those of UN FAO (2006, 2001). In particular, to calculate the amount of
land entering large-scale agriculture after deforestation, the parameters from UN FAO (2001) are applied.
According to the FAO study, around 10% of deforestation in Africa was due to conversion to this type of
land use, while for Latin America and Asia these were 46% and 30%, respectively.
In the simulations, the forest land-using sectors (agriculture and timber) are compensated to reduce
deforestation. In other words, it is assumed that avoided deforestation takes place only if it is profitable.
This is done in the model through a subsidy to land-using industries equal to the value of the avoided
emissions from REDD.
In Indonesia, a large share of deforestation emissions is associated with peatland drainage following
clearance of deep peat swamp forests. Peatlands are deposits of plant residuals and water formed over
thousands of years, which contain thousands of tons of carbon per hectare. The peat is drained during
deforestation, setting off a process of oxidation, as well as a risk of peat fires, which have enormous
emissions potential. Emissions can continue for decades after clearance and even if deforestation is falling,
aggregate emissions may continue to increase, as the rate of carbon loss from peat has a lagged effect.
Accordingly, reducing deforestation of peat swamp forests will also reduce the specific peatland emissions.
In addition, it is possible to abate peatland emissions with specific measures implemented directly on
already deforested peatland areas, such as peatland restoration and rehabilitation, fire prevention, and
water management.
To account for this deforestation-associated source of emissions, ICES explicitly consider peatland
emissions in Indonesia as part of total emissions (see section 5 for the relative baseline assumptions),
drawing on parameters on peatland deforestation and emissions reported in Busch et al., (2011), with
emissions assumed to take place over a 25-year timeframe. The country abatement potential has also been
tailored to capture the opportunities that might come either from reduced deforestation in peatland areas
or from peatland restoration and rehabilitation, fire prevention, and water management of peatland
deforested areas. The first was modeled by increasing Indonesian emission reduction potential from REDD
proportionally to the share of deforested land on peatland over total deforested land, while the second was
implemented through an aggregated marginal abatement cost curve for peat rehabilitation using
information reported in DNPI (2010).
The model is updated with sectoral emissions from CO2 CH4, N2O, PFCs, HFCs, and SF6 derived by Rose et
al. (2010). A further extension is the introduction of a carbon market involving all GHGs and not only CO2.
This feature allows the possibility of exploiting lower-cost abatement options in non-CO2 gases or emitting
sectors.
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